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PROTECTING TiE NEW WORLD
ORDER: IT Is TIME TO CREATE A
UNITED NATIONS ARMY'

I. INTRODUCTION

In vintage science fiction movies, the alien often erroneously assumed
that one person was in charge of the Earth, hence the phrase, "Take me
to your leader." Today, however, that command is not totally
preposterous. After almost fifty years, the United Nations is beginning to
evolve into a legitimate world organization with increasing importance in
world affairs. As the representative of the various member states, the
Secretary-General may indeed someday assume the role of defacto leader
of the planet. At present, however, the United Nations is going through
its adolescence, and growing pains are to be expected for some years to
come. As the United Nations demands more responsibility and
independence from the nations that created it, many member states,
particularly the United States, will be reluctant to relinquish supervision
and control.
The success of the new world order-in which the United Nations
assumes the mantel of world policeman-rests with the ability of the
United Nations to maintain peace, using force if necessary. 1 The degree
to which this goal will be realized is primarily dependent upon the support
of the United. States. 2 When the United States decides to contribute troops
in addition to political support, it insists on controlling the United Nationssponsored peacekeeping operation.' This position reinforces the role of
the United States as world police officer and impedes the emergence of an
alternative peacekeeping organization capable of reducing the United

* I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Professor Camille
Broussard, Head of Reference Services, Mendik Library, New York Law School, Jane L.
Gordon, Esq., and Robert F. Peake, Esq. Special thanks to my cousin, Matthew S. Lerner,
for his courage, patience, and sense of humor.
1. Creationof a U.N. Security Force:HearingBefore the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Sept. 24, 1992 (testimony of Sen. David L. Boren)

[hereinafter Testimony].
2. World Cop?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1992, at 13.
3. Id.
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States' international burden. During the cold war, the United Nations
was unable to take a leadership role in international conflicts, because
superpower rivalry precluded cooperation among nations.' However, the
end of the cold war has created a power vacuum in many parts of the
world, resulting in the emergence of formerly repressed ethnic tensions
and a sharp increase in the number and intensity of international conflicts.'
While recognizing the dawn of a new world order, some nations persist
in viewing the United Nations against the traditional backdrop of the cold
war. As a result, the United Nations is unable to respond effectively to
present and potential conflicts around the world.
The United Nations is called upon by the international community to
play a vital role in international affairs.' While willing to comply, it finds
itself hamstrung by nations that refuse to grant it more responsibility out
of fear that their own power will be diminished. Member nations desire
that the United Nations improve its peacekeeping ability; yet this desire is
unaccompanied by a pledge of troops to serve under a United Nations
command. 8
This Note will demonstrate the exigency of providing the United
Nations with "teeth" 9 by forming a standing United Nations army
composed of troops from and funded by the member states. 0 The
4. Id.
5. UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PARTNERS

FOR PEACE 2 (1992) [hereinafter PARTNERS].
6. 1992: The World at War, The Week in Germany, Jan. 15, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WKGERM File. Fifty-two wars were fought during 1992, a level

of international conflict unknown since 1945. Id. There are currently numerous
international conflicts which could escalate into war. Id. During the 1950s the yearly
average of wars in the international community was twelve; it increased to twenty-two in
the 1960s; thirty-two during the 1970s, and reached forty during the 1980s. Id.
7. See Nancy L. Kassebaum, Help the UN Live Up to Its Charter, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1992, at 19; Beef Up U.N. 's Peace Role, USA TODAY, Sept. 28,
1992, at 14A.
8. This is similar to the "not in my backyard" ("NIMBY") syndrome, which "is used
to express opposition by local citizens to the locating in their neighborhood of a civic
project, as a jail, garbage dump, or drug rehabilitation center, that, though needed by the
larger community, is considered unsightly, dangerous, or likely to lead to decreased
property values." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1300
(2d ed. 1987). See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not in My Back Yard"
Syndrome: An Approach to FederalPreemption of State and Local Impediments to the
Siting of PCB DisposalFacilities, 63 N.C. L. REV. 811 (1985).
9. U.S. Official Explains Go-Slow on Paying U.N. Dues, Reuters, June 9, 1992,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File [hereinafter Dues].
10. BOuTROS BOUTrROS-GHAL, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, 48 (1992) [hereinafter
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opportunity to strengthen the United Nations' enforcement powers will not
last indefinitely; if the international community does not seize this
moment, history will hold us accountable. 1 But if measures that enable
the United Nations to enforce its resolutions are enacted, the new world
order will be more than political verbiage. A United Nations army will
assist in maintaining international stability by discouraging regional
conflicts and violations of basic justice.12
In order to put the unique characteristics of the United Nations
mission in context, part II of this Note provides a brief history of past and
present United Nations peacekeeping activities, with an analysis of the
pertinent United Nations Charter provisions. Problems facing current
United Nations peacekeeping operations will also be identified. Part III
examines proposals to establish a United Nations army, including methods
to fund, train, equip, and deploy soldiers. The criticisms of creating a
United Nations army will then be examined.
II. CURRENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

A. History of Peacekeeping Operations
The United Nations was created after World War II with the
ambitious purpose of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of
war." 13 United States President Harry S. Truman wanted its mandate to
encompass the creation and enforcement of a new world order.14 He
contemplated the Security Council (the "Council") maintaining a military
force adequate to prevent acts of aggression. 5 However, the cold war and
the Soviet Union's exercise of its veto power in the Council frustrated the
President's vision, which became an early casualty of the cold war.' As
BOUTROS-GfALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE]; see PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 27; Paul
Lewis, U.N. Chief Asks for Armed Force to Serve as a Permanent Deterrent, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent].
11. David Boren, The World Needs an Army on Call, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1992, at
A21; see Testimony, supra note 1.
12. Boren, supra note 11.
13. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 27.
14. Boren, supra note 11.

15. Id.
16. See Eugene V. Rostow, Until W7at? Enforcement Action or Collective SelfDefense, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 506-07 (1991); Excerpt of the Hearing of the Senate
ForeignRelationsCommittee, Fed. News Serv., Jan. 21, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis
Library, FEDNEW File (nomination of Madeline Albright as Ambassador to United
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a result, when the United Nations did commence peacekeeping operations,
it did so in a haphazard fashion and without clear guidelines. The initial
United Nations deployment of troops was the first UN Emergency Force
("UNEF I"), which operated in the Egyptian-Israeli sector from November
1956 until 1967;' 7 it resulted in the birth of the "blue helmets," the
nickname given to UN peacekeeping soldiers.' During the same time
period, there were three foreign armies: British, French, and Israeli,
fighting on Egyptian soil;19 therefore, the United Nations adopted a unique
international identification symbol to avoid misidentification. Originally,
soldiers were to wear berets, the same light blue as the United Nations
flag; however, when it was discovered that these berets would require
months to manufacture, 20 the United States offered to spray paint
thousands of army helmet liners the proper shade of light blue and the
"blue helmets" were born. 2 Since 1945, more than 500,000 "blue
helmets" have participated in twenty-six peacekeeping operations, and
more than 800 soldiers from forty-three nations have lost their lives while
wearing the United Nations' colors.22
During the cold war, the UN conducted a total of thirteen
peacekeeping operations,' all based on the following basic principles:
Nations) [hereinafter Excerpt]; Boren, supra note 11.
17. DEP'T OF PUB. ImNo., THE BLuE HELMETS, at 8 (1985) [hereinafter BLUE
HELMETS].
18. Paul Lewis, A Short History of U.N. Peacekeeping, MHQ: Q.J. MiL. HisT.,
Autumn 1992, at 33, 38 [hereinafter Lewis, History].

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. International Correspondents (CNN television broadcast, July 4, 1992), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT File [hereinafter International]. See Keith E.
Greenberg, The Essential Art of Enpathy, MHQ: Q.J. MIL.HlST., Autumn 1992 at 64,
67; Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 33.
23. Thomas G. Weiss, New Challengesfor UN Military Operation: Implementing an
Agenda for Peace, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 53.
The following list of past peacekeeping operations includes the location, the starting
date, and the ending date, if applicable, of each operation:
(1) United Nations Emergency Force ("UNEF I"), 1956-1967; (2) United Nations

Observation Group in Lebanon ("UNOGIL"), 1958; (3) United Nations Operation in the
Congo ("ONUC"), 1960-1964; (4) United Nations Security Force in New West Guinea
("UNSF, in West Irian"), 1962-1963; (5) United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
(-UNYOM"), 1963-1964; (6) United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, 19651966; (7) Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican
Republic ("DOMREP"), 1965-1966; (8) Second United Nations Emergency Force in the
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consent of the parties, troops provided and financed by member states and
directed by the Secretary-General as commander in chief, and minimum
use of force.' Indeed, the experience gained from these peacekeeping
missions underscored the basic need for cooperation among the member
states, a clear and practicable United Nations mandate, continuing Council
support, and adequate financial arrangements.' For instance, the United
Nations Force in the Congo ("ONUC") was deployed in the former
Republic of the Congo (present-day Zaire) from July 1960 to June 1964.26
By the standards of the times, it was the largest, costliest, and most
complex peacekeeping operation ever undertaken. 27 During this operation,
234 "blue helmets" were killed2" and financial difficulties plagued the
operation. 29
Peacekeeping operations during the cold war were designed to
maintain the status quo; they suspended hostilities and afforded belligerents
Suez Canal Region and later in the Sinai Peninsula ("UNEF lI"), 1973-1979; (9) United
Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan ("UNGOMAP"), 1988-1990;
(10) United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group ("UNIIMOG"), 1988-1991; (11)
United Nations Transition Assistance Group ("UNTAG, in Namibia"), 1989-1990; (12)
United Nations Angola VerificationMission ("UNAVEM I"), 1989-1991; and (13) United
Nations Observer Group in Central America ("ONUCA"), 1989-1992. Id.
24. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the UnitedNations; Historic Opportunitiesto
Strengthen the World Body, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992, at 89, 90 [hereinafter BoutrosGhali, Empowering]; see also Weiss, supra note 23, at 53.
25. Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note 24.
26. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17.
27. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 39. For a description of the ONUC operation
see Stanley Meisler, Crisis in Katanga, MHQ: Q.J. MiL. HIST., Autumn 1992, at 70.
28. David C. Morrison, Make Peace-orElse, 24 NAT'L J. 2250, 2252 (1992).
29. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 39. See also David Binder & Barbara Crossette,
As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at Al
(stating that the number of peacekeeping soldiers has risen four-fold in 1993 and the
budget for peacekeeping operations increased from $700 million in 1991 to $2.8 billion
in 1992); Paul Lewis, Peacekeeperto Peacemaker:U.N. Confronting New Roles, N.Y.
TIMS, Jan. 25, 1993, at A2 [hereinafter Lewis, Peacekeeper] (United Nations members
owe more than $1 billion in dues). The United States owes a total of $733.1 million in
regular budget and peacekeeping dues. Paul Lewis, Panel Sees Growing U.N.
Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at A4. Russia owes $420.3 million; and two
other former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Belarus, owe $45.8 million and $12.5 million
respectively. Paul Lewis, With U.S. the Biggest Debtor, PresidentFinds U.N. Skeptical,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at A14 [hereinafter Lewis, U.N. Skeptical]; see Michael S.
Serrill, Under Fire;A Year into Office, Secretary-GeneralBoutros-GhaliFinds Himself
and the U.N. Tested by the New World Disorder, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 33.
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the opportunity and the incentive to negotiate." For example, the second
United Nations Emergency Force ("UNEF II") deployed troops to Egypt
from October 1973 to July 1979.31 In this operation, the United Nations
peacekeepers not only succeeded in achieving a suspension of the fighting
between Arabs and Israelis, but also played a critical role in pulling the
world back from the brink of a nuclear confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. 2
B. Present Conditions
The end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union resulted
in an unprecedented number of requests for the United Nations to resolve
conflicts throughout the world. 33 Ethnic rivalries which were often
suppressed by the superpowers during the cold war are no longer held in
check and have increased in intensity.' Today, there are at least fortyeight areas worldwide that suffer from ethnic strife." Pleas to the United
Nations to help settle conflicts and end humanitarian crises have propelled
its popularity to its highest point ever.36 Yet, as recently as 1987, Iranian
30. Weiss, supra note 23.
31. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17.

32. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 40.
33. See Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 34; Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note
24, at 89; Transkei Ruler Callsfor U.N. Deployment in South Africa, Agence France

Presse, Jan. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File; Canadian U.N.
Troops Arrive in Macedonia,Reuters, Dec. 28, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,
REUTER File; U.N. To Deploy Guards in Northern Iraq, UPI, Dec. 21, 1992, available

in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. See also Moira Farrow, Canada Running Out of
Troops, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 4, 1993, at A10 (noting that as a result of United Nations
duties around the world, Canada has a drastic shortage of soldiers for more traditional
deployment).

34. Binder & Crossette, supra note 29, at A14.
35. Id. The following nations suffer from varying degrees of ethnic strife: In Europe:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Spain, Britain, Germany, Romania, Russia, Moldova,
and Georgia; in the Middle East and North Africa: Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel,
Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan; in Africa South of the Sahara: Mauritania, Mali, Chad,
Somalia, Senegal, Liberia, Togo, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Zaire,
Angola, and South Africa; in Asia: Tajilistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, The People's Republic of China ("China"), Cambodia,

Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji; in Latin America: Guatemala, Colombia, Peru,
and Brazil. Id.
36.

.T. Nguyen, United Nations, UPI, Dec. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis

Library, UPI File. See also The United Nations: Heart of Gold, Limbs of Clay,
ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 21 [hereinafter Heart of Gold] (noting that after the cold
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President Ali Khamenei derided the General Assembly as "a paper factory
for issuing worthless and ineffective orders." 7 It is apparent that without
adequate military muscle to carry out these missions, the United Nations
is in danger of being perceived as a "paper tiger," with obvious
repercussions regarding its effectiveness."
The United Nations currently finds itself confronting not only
problems that accumulated during the cold war, but also an array of new
issues.3 9 Since 1988, United Nations forces have helped disarm warring
factions and assisted in organizing elections in Angola, Cambodia, El
Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and Western Sahara.' Significantly, the
1992 operation in Somalia marked the first time that the United Nations
embarked on a purely humanitarian mission.4 ' This operation also
demonstrates the belief of the international community that suffering
people have a legitimate and enforceable right to assistance.42 However,
the Council has made it clear that it is not presently prepared to authorize
military intervention based on human rights violations alone.43
war the demand for the United Nations' peacemaking facilities dramatically increased).
37. Excerpt, supra note 16. Paul Lewis, Iranian, in U.N., Rebuffs Reagan on CeaseFire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1987, at Al; Terry Atlas, U.N. PeacemakerRole Tested by
Gulf War, CHI. TRm., Sept. 27, 1987, at 22.
38. New World Disorder 1993: Where Does the U.N. Fit In? (CNN television
broadcast, Jan. 12, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT File, [hereinafter
Disorder].
39. Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 89.
40. Binder & Crossette, supra note 29, at A14.
41. Elizabeth Kurylo, Aid Mission to Somalia Marks 'New Chapter,' U.N. Chief Says,
ATLANTA J.& CONST., Dec. 5, 1992, at A9. Some suggest, however, that the United
States responded only after images of starving Somali children appeared on prime-time
television. See, e.g., Don't Forsake Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at A30;
Kurylo, supra, at A9. See also John M. Goshko & Barton Gellman, Idea of a Potent
U.N. Army Receives a Mixed Response; Pentagon, Third World Wary; Logistical
Questions Abound, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1992, at A24 (discussing the "CNN curve,"
which stands for the proposition that the broadcast media's use of graphic imagery spurs
nations to consider various forms of international intervention, then retrench to a policy
that spreads costs through multinational action under the aegis of the United Nations).
42. Paul Lewis, Mission to Somalia;First U.N. Goal Is Security; Political Outlook Is
Murky, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at A14 [hereinafter Lewis, Mission to Somalia].
43. George Graham, How to Lead the World Without Becoming Its Policeman: The
U.S. Dilemma in a New World Order, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 3. China, the United
Kingdom, India, and some African and Latin American countries are sensitive about
establishing precedents for outside interference in their internal affairs on human rights
grounds. Id. China, for instance, indicated that Somalia is the exception not the rule.
Lewis, Mission to Somalia, supra note 42, at A14. But cf. Mr. Human Rights,
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The increased demand for "blue helmets" has brought nearly
intolerable strains on the United Nations bureaucracy and resources." As
Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie, former commander of United
Nations troops in Sarajevo, coldly observed: "Don't get into trouble after
5 P.M. New York time or on Saturday or Sunday, because there's no one
to answer the [United Nations'] phone. "" Despite the obvious need, the
United Nations peacekeepers in New York only recently established an
around-the-clock peacekeeping command room."
The New York
peacekeeping operations department is under-staffed and shockingly illequipped for global missions. As Mackenzie's comment suggests, the
United Nations cannot adequately handle international communications,'
which are necessary for conducting effective operations.
The United Nations responds to international crises in an ad hoc
manner, establishing the criteria for intervention as the need arises.48
These difficulties inhibit the United Nations' ability to develop new and
more ambitious roles for itself in the new world order. 49 For example, the
Somalian operation, in which United Nations forces have adopted a more
aggressive approach to peacekeeping, prompted the following remark by
Mackenzie: "Somalia is not peacekeeping. If they piss you off, you kill
them. That's not peacekeeping. "5 Supplying the "blue helmets" with
Dec. 26, 1992, at 57, 58 ("Perhaps countries do have the collective right,
even the duty, to stop a sovereign state from doing abominable things to its own
citizens.").
44. Alan Philps, Peace Troops Win Battlefor Respectfrom the Sahara to Cambodia,
ECONOMIST,

Keeping Warring Factions Apart Is a Major Growth Industry, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 12, 1992, at 10; see BOurROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra

note 10, at
46-49.
45. Julia Preston, United Nations Is Faced with a Crisis of Credibility; Enforcement
Capability, Peace-KeepingRole at Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993, at A20.
46. Polishing Blue Helmets, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 39.
47. U.N. Struggles to Handle Growing World Crises, Agence France Presse, Jan. 12,
1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File [hereinafter Crises].
48. New World Disorder, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 9, 1993, at 14
[hereinafter World]. See also Graham, supra note 43 (noting that the international
community has not figured out how to meet its own challenges); Paul Lewis, U.N.
Undecided on Action to Halt Fighting in Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at A8
(noting that the Security Council's division over when and how to enforce ban on military
flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina).
49. Paul Lewis, U.N. in Bosnia War: Hope of Big World Role May Be a Casualty,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1992, at A8 [hereinafter Lewis, U.N. Casualty].
50. Randy Newell, Countries Don't Give Their Troops to UN to Die, Peacekeeper
Says, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 29, 1993, at All.
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adequate men, material, and facilities to accomplish their missions, and
defining 51a clear mandate for their missions, is necessary to ensure
success.

As of this writing, the United Nations is conducting thirteen
peacekeeping operations around the world,52 eight of which have been
51. Disorder,supra note 38.
52. Lewis, Peacekeeper,supra note 29.
The thirteen ongoing peacekeeping operations consist of:
(1) United Nations Truce Supervision Organization ("UNTSO") was created in June 1948
to monitor ceasefire and armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It
consists of approximately 225 unarmed military observers and costs roughly $30 million
per year.
(2) United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan ("UNMOGIP") was
started in January 1949 to monitor the border of the two nations. Presently, the force
consists of about forty military observers and costs $5 million.
(3) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus ("UNFICYP") was established in
March 1964 to keep the peace between the island's ethnic Greek and Turkish
communities. The force numbered over 2,000 troops at the beginning of December 1992
and is being reduced. It costs the United Nations approximately $9 million.
(4) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force ("UNDOF"), deployed in June 1974,
serves as a buffer between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights. Approximately 1,350
peacekeepers serve at a cost of $43 million.
(5) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon ("UNIFIL"), stationed in southern Lebanon
since March 1978, consists of 5,805 personnel at an annual cost exceeding $150 million.
(6) United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission ("UNIKOM") was established in April
1991 to patrol the demilitarized zone between the two nations. Approximately 500
military observers and other personnel serve at an annual cost of $67 million.
(7) United Nations Angola Verification Mission ("UNAVEM I") was created in June
1991 to disarm civil war combatants and monitor elections. The mission is comprised of
480 military and police personnel and 400 officials at a cost of $110 million.
(8) United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador ("ONUSAL") was commenced in
July 1991 to disarm civil war combatants, monitor police activities, human rights
violations, and agreement ending civil war. It is comprised of approximately 1,000
military and police personnel and 145 international civilian staff. So far it has cost about
$50 million.
(9) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara ("MINURSO") was
established in September 1991 and consists of about 350 personnel. However, its
authorized strength consists of about 2,000 troops, observers, and police and up to 1,000
civilians to supervise a referendum in which the region's inhabitants will choose either
independence or union with Morocco. To date, it has cost about $65 million.
(10) United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC") was authorized in
March 1992 to disarm combatants, organize elections, help with reconstruction, repatriate
refugees, and supervise key government ministries. It consists of approximately 17,500
military and police plus about 500 civilians. The cost for fifteen months is estimated at
$1.7 billion.
(11) United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia ("UNPROFOR") was
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launched since 1989.' 3 While some of the missions represent traditional
peacekeeping functions, the majority depart substantially from their
predecessors.54 For instance, the current agenda indicates that the United
Nations is moving from traditional peacekeeping-with lightly-armed
"blue helmets" in places where peace already exists-to a new period
where troops are stationed
in hostile environments and challenged
55
militarily by belligerents.

Between 1948 and 1992, the United Nations conducted twenty-six
peacekeeping operations, involving 528,000 troops, at a total cost of
approximately $8.3 billion. 6 Presently, the United Nations deploys nearly
90,000 peacekeeping troops57 throughout the world at an annual cost of
established in March 1992 to protect Serb areas in Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina
to escort relief supplies, collect weapons from combatants around Sarajevo, and monitor
military flights at airports. Roughly 23,000 troops, police, and civilians are deployed and
an additional 700 troops have been authorized for Macedonia. The estimated annual cost
is $600 million.
(12) United Nations Operation in Somalia ("UNOSOM") was created in April 1992 to
guard relief supplies. Originally 4,400 troops and support personnel costing $200 million
were authorized. But in December 1992, the U.S. was authorized to lead a separate
operation consisting of up to 30,000 troops.
(13) United Nations Operation in Mozambique ("ONUMOZ) was comprised in
December 1992 to monitor agreements ending civil war, disarm combatants, organize
elections, and conduct a humanitarian program. It will consist of about 7,500 military
personnel, police, and civilians. Moreover, the estimated cost through October 1993 is
over $330 million. See Troopsfor Mozambique Make 13th PeacekeepingMission, Reuter
Library Report, Dec. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File
[hereinafter Troops]; see also Lewis, Peacekeeper, supra note 29 (listing current
peacekeeping operations); Weiss, supra, note 23 (providing a table of 1992 United Nations
peacekeeping operations).
The blue helmets, as of September 1993, find themselves deployed in 17 operations
on four continents. Mr. Cinton's U.N. Reality Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A20
[hereinafter Reality Test].
53. Excerpt, supra note 16.
54. See Boutros-Ohali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 90; Weiss, supra note 23.
55. Disorder,supra note 38. See also Elaine Sciolino, U.S. and FranceAre Split on
Role of U.N. in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A7 (reporting that France and the
United States differ over the proposed mandate for the United Nations peacekeeping forces
in Bosnia).
56. BOUTROS-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 47; see also 1992
UNrrED NATIONS HANDBOOK 65 (noting figures through July 15, 1992).
57. Polishing Blue Helments, supra note 46. Deployment of the blue helmets has
increased so rapidly that it is difficult to obtain a current number of troops deployed. C.
1992 U.N. HANDBOOK 65 (noting approximately 44,000 troops and civilian police by
May, 1992); Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Afternoon Session, Fed.
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The number of new peacekeeping missions
billions of dollars."8
undertaken since 1988 exceeds the total number of such activities during
the first forty years of its existence.5 9
The demand for United Nations forces has increased so rapidly that
the number of troops deployed increased from 10,000 troops to over
80,000 in less than five years.' At the same time, the cost of global
peacekeeping operations increased from $421 million in 1991 to an
estimated $2.7 billion in 1992.61 Though significant, the amount of money
spent on peacekeeping operations is relatively inexpensive in comparison
to global defense expenditures. 62 On average, member nations give the
United Nations only fourteen dollars for every thousand dollars spent on
their own defense forces. 63
News Serv., Jan. 7, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter
Session] (noting 50,000 troops before Somalia); Serrill, supra note 29 (noting 60,000
troops); Troops, supra note 52 (noting roughly 55,000 troops); Nguyen, supra note 36
(noting more than 50,000 troops); Paul Lewis, U.N. ChiefShifts Key Official to a Role
As Peace Mediator, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at A8 (noting 60,000 troops); BoutrosGhali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 90 (exceed 50,000 troops by end of 1992); Preston,
supra note 45 (noting 53,000 troops); Paul Lewis, United Nations Is Finding Its Plate
Increasingly Full But Its CupboardIs Bare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at A8 (noting
80,000 troops) [hereinafter Lewis, Full Plate].
58. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 33-34.
59. Serrill, supra note 29, at 33; Troops, supra note 52.
60. Paul Lewis, 5 Key Nations Urge Prudence in Setting Peacekeeping Goal, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at A2 [hereinafter Lewis, Nations Urge Prudence]. See also Lewis,
History, supra note 18, at 34; 1992 U.N. HANDBOOK 65.
61. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 34; 1992 U.N. HANDBOOK 65; Lance Morrow,
An Interview: The Man in the Middle, MHQ: Q.J. Mil. Hist., Autumn 1992, at 51. See
also Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 95 (during the first half of 1992
peacekeeping costs increased from $700 million to about $2.8 billion); Lewis, Nations
Urge Prudence,supra note 60, at A2 (noting that peacekeeping costs have increased from
a few hundred million dollars a year to over $3 billion). In 1993, the United Nations
peacekeeping costs may exceed $3.6 billion. Steven A. Holmes, ainton May Let U.S.
Troops Serve Under U.N. Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at Al, A7.
62. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal News Service, June 9, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Senate]. See also
BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 47 (noting that global defense
expenditures at the end of the 1980s approached $1 trillion a year, or $2 million per
minute); PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 49 (noting that the arms race between the Western
countries and the former Soviet bloc accounted for four-fifths of all weapons outlays in
the world).
63. Buying Blue Helmets, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 43. See also Senate, supra
note 62 (stating that the United Nations can help secure democracy at a small fraction of
the money spent by the United States to win the cold war); Excerpt, supra note 16 (noting

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 14

C. United Nations CharterProvisions
The United Nations Charter (the "Charter") lists as its first objective
the maintenance of international peace and security.' To this end, the
United Nations is empowered to "take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace."' Chapters VI and VII
of the Charter set out the measures the United Nations can take in
achieving this objective." Chapter VI provides for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes.67 If attempts at peaceful resolution are
unsuccessful and a conflict arises which threatens international peace and
security, chapter VII provides for a progressive response to achieve the
restoration of international order.68 Pursuant to article 41 of the Charter,
the Council may first invoke measures not involving armed force, such as
economic or political sanctions.69 If these measures prove inadequate,
article 42 directs the use of armed force to resolve the dispute and restore
international peace and security.7" The Council, acting on the behalf of
the entire international community, must decide on an appropriate course
of action. 7 '
The distinctions between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace
enforcement are often blurred.72 Peacemaking focuses on bringing hostile
parties to agreement, primarily through the peaceful means outlined in
chapter VI of the Charter.73 Thus, peacemaking involves such activities
as conciliation, mediation, and shuttle diplomacy.74 Peacekeeping, by
that the total U.S. budget to the United Nations is $1.1 billion, which is also the cost of
one B-2 bomber); Bungee Jumping at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at A22
[hereinafter Bungee Jumping] (explaining that the current United Nations peacekeeping
budget is less a than the annual cost of New York City's police force and it is 0.1% of
member states' total defense budgets).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
65. Id. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 5.
66. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 5.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 5-6.
69. Id. at 6.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 5.
73. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10,
PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 5 (providing a definition of peacemaking).
74. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 5.

20; see also
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comparison, is the deployment of a United Nations force in the field to
effectuate a standstill of hostilities; peacekeeping thus requires the consent
of all warring factions, comprised of both military and civilian.75 Finally,

peace enforcement refers to measures taken to compel compliance with

steps demanded by the United Nations. 7 6 The coercion employed may be
economic or political, as described in article 41, or military, as provided
in article 42.' The chapters of the United Nations Charter that provide
the organization with its dispute resolution powers specifically embrace
peacemaking in chapter VI, and peace enforcement in chapter VII.
Chapter VI outlines the peaceful means to be used to settle disputes,' and
chapter VII empowers the Security Council to use military action to curb
aggression if peaceful means prove inadequate. 7 9 The Charter does not,
however, expressly provide for peacekeeping operations.8 0 SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskj6ld, who humorously referred to such operations
as "chapter six and a half" because they fell somewhere between chapters
VI and VII,"1 is often credited with inventing the idea of peacekeeping.8 2
Article 43 requests that "[a]ll Members . . . undertake to make
75. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10,

20; see also

PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 5.

76. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 5.

77. Id.
1. This provision declares that "[t]he parties to any
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 33,
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their own choice." Id. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17,
at 5; Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 34.
79. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. This section states in pertinent part that "[tihe Security
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures." Id. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 5-6; Lewis,
History, supra note 18, at 34-35
80. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 3; Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 34. See
Thomas R. Pickering, The 1991 Otto L. Walter Distinguished International Fellow
Program, Address at New York Law School, in 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COM. L.
83, 85 (1992).
81. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 34. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 3.
82. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 8. Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 34. Some
scholars have traced the use of peacekeeping forces as far back as the fifth century B.C.,
when the Greek city-states jointly patrolled the Aegean Sea. Id. at 35. Moreover, the
League of Nations advocated the use of military force to maintain the League covenants.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, para. 2.
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available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security." 8" Article 42 authorizes the Council to
take military action to maintain or restore international peace and
security." These measures, which must be authorized by the Council,
constitute the core of the system of collective defense described in the
Charter as ensuring international peace and security.8 5 However, any of
the five permanent members of the Council-China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, or the United States-may block any proposed measures
by veto. 6 The permanent Council members also control the Military Staff
Committee, composed exclusively of the Council's military
representatives.8 7 Consequently, the United Nations collective security
system can only function effectively if there is full cooperation from the
permanent Council members.8 8
Following World War II, any such cooperation quickly collapsed
with the advent of the cold war. 9 Since the creation of the United Nations
in 1945, more than 100 major conflicts around the world have resulted in
approximately twenty million deaths.' ° The United Nations was powerless
to intervene on numerous occasions, as 279 measures were vetoed in the
Council due to the ideological differences characteristic of the cold war. 91
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1. See Rostow, supra note 16, at 507; BLuE HELMETS,
supra note 17, at 6. Interestingly, in 1946 and 1947, the permanent members of the
Security Council attempted to produce a model article 43 agreement, specifically,
guidelines by which member states would supply forces to the United Nations. See
Pickering, supra note 80, at 88-90. Declassified documents show that four of the five
permanent Security Council members agreed to create a United Nations army, but the
Soviet Union refused. Keith White, Boren Supports Participationin U.N. Military Force,
Gannett News Service, Sept. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. This article states that the Council "may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Id.
85. BLuE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 6.

86. Id. See PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 14-15.
87. BLuE HELMETS, supra note 17, at 6.
88. Id.
89. Id. See also Lewis, History, supra note 18, at 35 (stating cold war rivalries
ensured that the plan for a team of peacekeeping forces would be stillborn).
90. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 14.
91. Id. Since May 31, 1990, there have not been any vetoes in the Council. Id. 15.
However, in May, 1993, Russia, which retained the seat of the former Soviet Union,
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D. An Overview of Current Problems

There are three fundamental obstacles to effective United Nations
peacekeeping operations: the reluctance of members to commit troops to
United Nations command, the acquisition and transportation of supplies
and equipment," and the collection of sufficient financing to meet the cost
of peacekeeping operations." Although article 43 of the Charter permits
member nations to furnish troops for Council military operations,95 the
Western powers, particularly the United States, are reluctant to commit
troops to United Nations command." Arguably, requiring the United
States to furnish troops would be unconstitutional in that it would
effectively permit the United Nations to deploy United States forces
without the consent of Congress and the President. 7 However, the UN
exercised its veto power for the first time in nine years to block a plan to change the
financing of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Frank J. Prial, Russia
Dusts Off a Long-Unused Security Council Tactic: The Veto, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1993,
at A10. Russia, when combined with its predecessor, the Soviet Union, has employed its
veto 115 times, while the United States has used its veto 69 times. Id.
92. See Frank J. Prial, U.N. Seeks Signal on Troop Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1992, at Al 1 [hereinafter Prial, U.N. Seeks Signal] (noting that the United States has been
reluctant to commit troops to foreign command); Thalif Deen, Disarmament. U.N. Seeks
Volunteersfor Rapid Deployment Force, Inter Press Service, Sept. 26, 1992, availablein
LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File [hereinafter Deen, Disannament] (noting that only
France volunteered to contribute troops to a permanent United Nations force).
93. See Lee Michael Katz, Can the U.N. Handle Its 'New Credibility'?,USA TODAY,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 15A.
94. See Paul Lewis, U.N. 's Top Troop Official Sees No Need for War Room, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at A12 [hereinafter Lewis, War Room].
1.
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 43,
96. ThalifDeen, U.N.: ProposalFor U.N. Army Shelved, Inter Press Service, Jan. 6,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File [hereinafter Deen, Proposal
Shelved]; Excerpt, supra note 16; Prial, U.N. Seeks Signal, supra note 92, at 11; Deen,
Disarmament, supra note 92.
97. See Excerpt, supra note 16 (noting the statements of Sen. Jesse Helms); Weiss,
supra note 23, at 62 (stating that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are
reluctant to release control of their troops and give the United Nations blank checks for
their use).
The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542-1548 (1988), requires the President
to "consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances .... " 50 U.S.C. § 1542. Within forty-eight hours of introducing armed
forces equipped for combat into imminent or actual hostilities; into the territory, airspace,
or waters of a foreign nation; or "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation," the President
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cannot commit the United States to military action without American
consent, since the United States retains its Council veto over any proposed
use of force.9" Reluctance by the member nations seriously impairs the
effectiveness of article 43 and forces the United Nations to collect troops
in an ad hoc, inefficient, and time consuming manner."
Once a peacekeeping operation is approved, the campaign to convince
members to commit troops begins." ° It can take between four and six
weeks of difficult negotiations before the United Nations obtains just 700
soldiers.1 °1 Furthermore, the Council must achieve a consensus as to
which nation will command the force. 1" Logistical and communications
equipment must then be purchased.1 °3 Not surprisingly, it can take
between three and six months to deploy forces, 1 because the United
must submit a written report to Congress that explains the necessity of introducing armed
forces into an area, "the constitutional and legislative authority under which such
introduction took place," and the estimated scope and length of United States involvement.
50 U.S.C. § 1543(a). After submitting the report, the use of United States Armed Forces
must be terminated within sixty days, unless Congress "(1) has declared war or has
enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has
extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of
an armed attack upon the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The sixty-day period
may not be extended beyond an additional thirty days. Id. Moreover, if at any time
"United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United
States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by
concurrent resolution." 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).
The debate over whether Presidents are obligated to consult with Congress over
dispatching troops has existed since the United States was created. Neil A. Lewis, War
Powers: An Old Debate Clinton May Resolve, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993, at A4.
Presidents have deployed military forces abroad between 120 and 200 times, but Congress
has formally declared war only five times: the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War,
the Mexican-American War, World War I, and World War I. Id.
98. Robert Wright, Bold Old Vision: The Casefor Collective Security: Clinton Foreign
Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 25, 1993, at 19; White, supra note 83.
99. See Press Conference by the UNO Secretary Boutros-Ghali (Official Kremlin Int'l
News Broadcast, Sept. 8, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SOVNWS File
[hereinafter Press Conference].
100. See Nightline: UNSecretay-GeneralGhalion Somalian Situation(ABC television
broadcast, Sept. 9, 1992), availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNEW File [hereinafter
Nightline].
101. Id.
102. See Press Conference, supra note 99.
103. Id. See lightline, supra note 100.
104. See Nightline, supra note 100 (noting that it took four months to send 1000 troops
to Yugoslavia); Press Conference, supra note 99; Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note
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Nations is required to engage in this preliminary logistical exercise each
time it undertakes a new peacekeeping operation." 5 Recently, the UN
forces deployed along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border were delayed for several
weeks while awaiting military observers and vehicles."o
The United Nations also faces budgetary constraints that threaten its
ability to engage in peacekeeping operations. 0 7 Its budget presently
comprises three categories: mandatory dues, voluntary contributions, and
a separate peacekeeping budget.'
Because numerous members are
delinquent in paying their dues, the United Nations has no funds in reserve
and must shift funds from one account to another to meet its expenses."
Specifically, only eighteen of the United Nations's 180 members paid their
dues in full by the January 31, 1993, deadline.'
Members currently owe
approximately $1.8 billion designated for the regular budget and the
maintenance of peacekeeping operations."'
As a result, delay and insufficient funding often hamper the United
Nations when it embarks on a peacekeeping mission." 2 The Secretary
General cannot send troops without obtaining money, and he cannot raise
24, at 89, 92. See also Lewis, U.N. Casualty, supra note 49 (stating that although nations

have agreed to send troops to Bosnia, they have been extraordinarily slow with
deployment).
105. See Press Conference, supra note 99. Madeleine K. Albright, the current United

States delegate to the United Nations, advocates the development of a database containing
what nations can supply "so that the Secretary-General doesn't have to go around with a

tin cup." Holmes, supra note 61, at A7.
106. U.N. Force Will Need Weeks to Fully Deploy, Its Chief Says, L.A. TIMEs, Apr.
20, 1991, at A13.
107. See BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10,
41, 47-49, 69,
70, 72. See also Weiss, supra note 23, at 51, 54 (the peacekeeping budget is roughly
$800 million in arrears). For an analysis of United Nations budgetary problems see
PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 63; Lewis, Full Plate, supra note 57, at A8.
108. Buying Blue Helmets, supra note 63.
109. Id.
110. Id. Buying Blue Helmets, supra note 63.
111. Press Conference, supra note 99. See also Dues, supra note 9 (noting that the
United States owes millions of dollars in dues to the United Nations in part because it

fears the onslaught of money would lead to irresponsible financial actions). See also
Senate, supra note 62 (noting that the United States is farther in arrears for its United
Nations peacekeeping dues than any other nation). By the end of September 1993, the

United States will owe the United Nations $1 billion in peacekeeping and regular budget
dues. Lewis, Full Plate, supra note 57, at A8.
112. Id. See Buying Blue Helmets, supra note 63.
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money without the approval of the General Assembly."1 For example,
efforts to reduce the cost of the recent mission in Croatia delayed the
dispatch of 14,000 troops.'
The United Nations seeks to mount a
mission in Cambodia at a potential cost of $1.9 billion, 1 but member
nations remain unwilling to provide the financing necessary to solve this
and other crises."6 Therefore, it is imperative that as a prerequisite to the
creation of an effective peacekeeping force, the United
Nations restructure
117
the way it finances its peacekeeping operations.
III. RESTRUCTURING THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES

A. The Need for a United Nations Army
The United Nations must be prepared to meet force with force.1 1

s

Not

only must it deploy forces to accomplish specific objectives, but these
forces must also be of sufficient size and strength to accomplish their
objectives with a minimum of military and civilian casualties. 1 9 Although
force should be employed only as a last resort, this option must be
available in fact, not merely in theory. 2 ' The ability to wield effective
force is essential to the United Nations' credibility as a guarantor of
international security. 2
The time has come to provide the United Nations with a permanent,
well-trained, multinational army, under unified command and capable of
rapid deployment. 22 An effective United Nations army must be able to
113. Nightline, supra note 100.
114. Tim Judah et al., Budget Wrangle Delays UN Force Deployment, THE TIMES
(London), Feb. 26, 1992, at 9; 3 Nations Balk at Cost of UN Force, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27,
1992, at 4 [hereinafter 3 Nations].
115. 3 Nations, supra note 114; cf. Troops, supra note 52 (cost for fifteen months
estimated at $1.7 billion).
116. Buying Blue Helmets, supra note 63.
117. See Bungee Jumping, supra note 63; see infra text accompanying notes 140-44.
118. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 27.
119. Id.
120. BOUTROS-OHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 43.
121. Id.
122. A ForeignLegionfor the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1992, at A16 [hereinafter
Legion].
Curiously, Boutros-Ghali appears reluctant to refer to the proposed rapid deployment
force as a "United Nations army." He stated, "I never asked for an army of the United
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use standardized equipment, share intelligence, and mobilize within fortyeight hours.123 A standing army under Council command would help
preserve peace because a potential aggressor would know that the Council
possesses the capability of mounting an immediate military response."
Indeed, the Secretary-General is authorized under article 43 to request that
members designate troops to be employed in the event of a crisis. 25
While such forces may never be sufficiently powerful to defeat a major
army supplied with sophisticated
weapons, they could be effective in
26
foes.
lesser
deterring
For the first time since the inception of the United Nations, the new
political climate has eliminated longstanding obstacles to achieving these
arrangements.' 27 Currently, there are three potential methods of
structuring forces: (1) troops from various armed forces permanently
assigned to United Nations duty and activated jointly by the Council and
the Secretary-General; (2) units designated by various nations for United
Nations use but requiring each government to approve participation in any
United Nations mission; and (3) the formation of a foreign legion in which
individuals from various nations would volunteer to serve in United
128
Nations units.
Nations. What I'm asking is that different member states put at the United Nations's
disposal a contingent of troops. They would be trained by the member states and be put
at the disposal of the secretary-general." Katz, supra note 93, at 15A.
Marrack Goulding, the former United Nations Undersecretary General responsible
for overseeing peacekeeping operations, who is now in charge of peace mediation,
reiterated the Secretary-General's reluctance to refer to the proposed force as an army by
stating that the troops would remain part of their country's armies, but would be
designated by the governments of those countries to be available on short notice to the
Secretary-General for service in operations authorized by the Council. All Things
Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 20, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
SCRIPT File. This is a matter of semantics. Once an operation is approved and the
troops deployed, the force constitutes an army.
123. Legion, supra note 122.

124. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN

AGENDA FOR PEACE,

supra note 10,

43.

125. Boren, supra note 11. Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent, supra note 10.
126. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10,
43. See also
PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing possible benefits of a United Nations armed
forces capable of being deployed effectively on short notice).
127. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 43.
128. Id. 44; see also David Evans, The Casefor a HuwanitarianArny, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 20, 1992, at C3 (describing the requirements and goals of a potential United Nations
foreign legion).

126
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B. An Agenda for Peace
On January 31, 1992, for the first time in United Nations history, the
permanent Council members requested that the Secretary-General prepare
a position paper on peacemaking, peacekeeping, and preventive
diplomacy. 29 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported that the Council
had emerged from the cold war as the central instrument for the
preservation of peace and the prevention and resolution of conflicts. 3 '
Boutros-Ghali's report requested a permanent armed force to deter
aggression and enforce peace by using the military might of its major
members. 31
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali also requested the creation of peace
enforcement units which would respond to outright aggression, whether
imminent or actual,' 32 and consist of volunteers more heavily armed and
better trained than regular peacekeeping forces."3 Approximately forty
countries would be asked to provide a total of 40,000 troops consisting of
three types: (1) rapid deployment forces which would be able to respond
to a crisis anywhere in the world within forty-eight hours, 3 4 (2) infantry,
Until summoned by the Council, these troops would
and (3) police.'
remain with their national forces, where they would undergo preparatory
training."6 Also, Boutros-Ghali's proposal would commit governments to
provide, within an agreed notice period, specially-trained troops for
service in both peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. 37 The
participating members would establish a reserve stock of basic military
items required for new peacekeeping operations, and would station
reserves of equipment at strategic locations around the world for use when
129. Press Conference, supra note 99; see BOUTRoS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE,
supra note 10, 1; PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 9.
130. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 15.
131. Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent, supra note 10; Deen, ProposalShelved, supra
note 96.
132. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 44.
133. Id.
134. Katz, supra note 93, at 15A.

135. Id.
136. See Warren Strobel, Blue Line Stretched Thin; Peacekeepers Do Everything
Everywhere, WASH. TIMEs, July 19, 1992, at Al.
137. Nightline: U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 4, 1993), availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNEW File [hereinafter

Secretary-General].
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the need arose. 38 Finally, members would assist the United Nations
peacekeeping efforts by exchanging intelligence on impending crises.13 9
Regardless of Boutros-Ghali's proposals, the United Nations will be
unable to meet the challenges of the new world order until its financial
difficulties are resolved. 4 ° Toward this goal, members would promptly
pay for approved military operations.41 and finance them with money from
their defense budgets. 42 Additionally, the United Nations would establish
a special fund of $50 million for peacekeeping start-up costs and1 43a
endowment fund of $1 billion for future peacekeeping operations.
According to Boutros-Ghali, these proposals, if enacted, would ameliorate
the personnel, equipment, and financial problems that currently plague
United Nations peacekeeping missions."'
The European Community cautiously endorsed the SecretaryGeneral's proposal on preventive employment of UN peacekeeping forces
which would include troops stationed inside any nation fearful of
invasion.1 45 The Community agreed to examine the possibility of
designating specific military units to serve as reserves for peacekeeping
operations.'" However, several nations have expressed concern about
and prefer that deployment be
when such forces should be dispatched
1 47
basis.
case
by
case
a
on
decided
Other nations responded more favorably. 14' France and Russia
138. Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 93.
139. Weiss, supra note 23, at 58; see BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE,
supra note 10, 24; Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent, supra note 10, at Al, A10.
140. BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 69.
141. Weiss, supra note 23, at 63; see Aryeh Neier, Dialogue: Rights and Foreign
Policy; Fight Abuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1992, at A31.
142. Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent,supra note 10, at Al, A10. Democratic Senator
Paul Simon (Ill.) proposed legislation that would charge peacekeepingbills to the Defense
Department, as part of the cost of maintaining national security. Lewis, U.N. Skeptical,
supra note 29.
143. Thomas L. Friedman, The U.N. Assembly; Bush, in Address to U.N., Urges More
Vigor in Keeping the Peace, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1992, at Al.

144. See Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 89; see generally Buying Blue
Helmets, supra note 63 (report regarding United Nations financial reform by group headed
by Paul Volcker, Shijuro Ogata, and Sir Brian Urquhart).
145. Paul Lewis, EuropeansUrge the U.N. to Act More Aggressively to Prevent War,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at A16 [hereinafter Lewis, Europeans Urge].

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Press Conference, supra note 99; Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent,supra note 10,
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strongly endorsed the proposal giving the Council a rapid deployment
force. 149 France offered 1000 troops available twenty-four to forty-eight
hours after being called, and 2000 troops available within one week. 150 In
addition, the Nordic countries have soldiers on permanent standby for
peacekeeping duties."' Plans for a standing United Nations army,
due to strong opposition by the United
however, have been suspended
1 52
powers.
States and other
The Secretary-General's proposal went further than former United
States President George Bush's position on a United Nations army. 5
Former Secretary of State James Baker informed a Senate committee that
the concept of a United Nations military force required additional study
Although admitting the need for enhanced
and careful consideration."
at Al; see John G. Ruggie, No the World Doesn't Need a U.N. Army, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IHT File; Lewis, Europeans
Urge, supra note 145; New Zealand Backs Use of More PeacekeepersOverseas, Xinhua
General News Service, Nov. 4, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File;
Rolf Soderlind, Kohl Says Gernany Will Join U.N. Troops This Year, Reuters, Jan. 3,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
149. Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent, supra note 10, at A16; Ruggie, supra note 148;
PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 27. See also Paul Lewis, At U.N., Russian Stresses Peril of

Ethnic Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at All [hereinafter Lewis, Ethnic Conflict]
(noting that Russia advocates expanded United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking
operations).
150. Press Conference, supra note 99; but see PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33
(suggesting that France's offer of 2000 troops is of more political than military
significance because the contribution of any nation would have to be more substantial than
2000 troops to be a serious part of a multinational rapid deployment force).
151.

Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent, supra note 10.

152. Deen, ProposalShelved, supra note 96.
153. Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent,supra note 10, at Al, A1O; see Baker Says U.N.
Force Idea Needs More Study, June 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
REUTER File [hereinafter Baker]; Bush Offers to Help Strengthen U.N. Peacekeeping
Capabilities, Reuters, Sept. 22, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File
[hereinafter Bush] (stressing unwillingness of the United States to commit troops under
international command); see also Frank J. Murray, Bush Offers U.N. Army Everything but
Troops, WASH. TPAEs, Sept. 22, 1992, at A3.
154. See Baker, supra note 153; Ruggie, supra note 148. The Commission on
Improving the Usefulness of the United Nations, which was formed during the Bush
Administration, recently released its recommendations. Paul Lewis, U.S. PanelSplits on
Ways to Improve the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at A13. Although a majority
of the sixteen member panel argued that the end of the cold war presented an opportunity
for the Untied Nations to assist in global affairs, dissenting members stated that it remains
uncertain whether the "United Nations is ready for the post-cold-war world." Id. These
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United Nations peacekeeping efforts, Baker expressed reservations about

placing American soldiers under international command.S1 S Baker insisted
that member states must retain the final decision on the use of their
troops. 1"6 Indeed, during the Gulf War, this concern resulted in the
United States' command of international forces. 57
The Clinton administration is currently studying how best to create an
international peacekeeping force 58 but has yet to formulate a position on
a United Nations army." 9 President Bill Clinton did, however, endorse
the idea of providing small numbers of troops that could be called upon
on short notice as part of a United Nations effort in emergency
situations." ° In addition to supporting a strengthened United Nations,
President Clinton believes the United States should pay its United Nations
His administration recognizes that the present peacekeeping
bills.16
differences of opinion represent the divisions that must be overcome if the United States
is to present a coherent policy regarding the United Nation's role in international affairs.
155. Baker, supra note 153; Lewis, U.N. Asks for Deterrent, supra note 10, at Al,
AlO.
156. Friedman, supra note 143; Murray, supra note 153. However, the War Powers
Act could be amended to ensure the United States does not surrender final approval of
committing its troops to United Nations operations. Boren, supra note 11; see PARTNERS,
supra note 5, at 34 (suggesting alternatives for congressional approval of deployment).
See also Testimony, supra note 1 (stating that an agreement based on article 43, while
reflecting the spirit of the War Powers Resolution, may not require the resolution's
revision or amendment and Congress could draft a bill without reopening the War Powers
Resolution). United Nations members that lack veto power in the Council could condition
their commitment to a rapid deployment force on the right to withdraw units for their own
urgent national security interests. Boren, supra note 11.
157. Baker, supra note 153.
158. See Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Fed. News Service, Jan.
7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Hearing]
(confirmation hearing for Rep. Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense).
159. The MacNeilfLehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 16, 1992),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MACLEH File.
160. Dan Oberdorfer, On Global Matter Two Candidates' Positions Are Mostly in
Sync, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, at A7.
161. USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing, Federal News Service, Sept. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File (Clinton-Gore Foreign Policy)
[hereinafter Press Briefing]. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly,
President Clinton stated that the United States would pay its delinquent peacekeeping and
regular budget dues. Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton, at U.N., Lists Stiff Terms for
Sending U.S. Force to Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at Al. However, promises
to pay past United Nations dues have been made before, to no avail. Reality Test, supra

note 52, at A20.
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system is overextended and that much more than traditional peacekeeping

operations are required.' 62

However, it remains to be seen whether

President Clinton will in fact support the proposed multinational force and,
if he does, to what extent the United States will be involved in its
operation and staffing. 6 3
Under a compromise between the State Defense Departments over their respective
authority and financial responsibilities in peacekeeping operations, the State Department
would control and pay for peacekeeping operations arising under Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter while the Pentagon would control and pay for enforcement operations
arising under chapter VII. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Narrows Terms for its Peacekeepers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A8; see discussion infra part II.D.
162. U.N. Muscle Building, DEF. NEws, Jan. 18-24, 1993, at 22. Some of the
changes the Clinton administration is considering include: establishing an around-the-clock
operations center, see supra text accompanying note 46, improving logistical support for
peacekeeping operations, see supra text accompanying notes 92-99, and improving
accounting and budgeting procedures, see supra text accompanying notes 107-17.
Holmes, supra note 61.
President Clinton articulated his ideas to the United Nations General Assembly. The
President believes that the United Nations must possess the technical means to manage
modern peacekeeping operations. In ainton's Words: U.N. CannotBecome Engaged in
Every World Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at A16 [hereinafter Clinton's Words].
Toward this goal, the President supports the creation of a genuine United Nations
peacekeeping headquarters and a modern operations center equipped with global
communications, providing the planning staff with access to timely intelligence, and the
formation of a logistics unit that can be deployed on short notice. Id. President Clinton
also stressed that the United Nations' operations also must be adequately funded. Id.
163. See Press Briefing, supra note 161. The Clinton Administration is considering
an expanded role in United Nations peacekeeping operations that would permit United
States troops to serve under foreign commanders on a regular basis. Holmes, supra note
61; cf. U.S. Troopsfor a U.N. Army, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1993, at A14 (arguing that
President Clinton should take additional steps to strengthen the United Nations'
peacekeeping forces).
President Clinton's evolving policy appears intent on limiting the involvement of the
United States in future United Nations operations. See Sciolino, supra note 161, at A8.
Presidential Decision Directive 13, a classified paper on peacekeeping, recommends that
the United States limit involvement to situations that threaten its national interest. Id.
Moreover, the United States would retain control over all large-scale or dangerous
operations, but might cede control over small-scale, safer operations. Id. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher, who endorsed American participation in a small, permanent
United Nations rapid deployment force during his confirmation hearings, now believes that
American involvement "is warranted only when it serves the central purpose of American
foreign policy, to protect American interests." Id.
In his address to the Uniied Nations, President Clinton outlined the policy criteria
that must be satisfied as a prerequisite to American participation in future United Nations
peacekeeping operations: an existence of a genuine threat to international peace; clear
military and political objectives for the proposed operation; the financial cost of American
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C. Proposalsfor a United Nations Army

Richard Gardner, an advisor to President Clinton on United Nations
affairs and a professor of international law at Columbia University, is a
staunch advocate of a permanent United Nations force.1 6" He has
proposed that the five permanent Council members each contribute
approximately 2000 men, with roughly thirty other nations each
committing up to 700 soldiers.165 Where necessary, air and naval forces
would support these troops."' By spreading responsibility for raising this
UN army among many member nations, the Gardner plan increases the
chances that the United Nations force will be perceived as a multinational
force, not subject to national or parochial interests. 167 The type of force
16
Gardner proposes could perform a number of different operations. 1
Troops could be stationed in advance on the border of a country threatened
by potential aggression, intervene to halt an ongoing invasion, open and
defend humanitarian relief corridors in domestic civil wars, and respond
to acts of international terrorism. 169
A task force of diplomats, academics, military officers, and members
of the United Nations Association of the United States drafted a proposal
that has attracted the interest of such influential Democratic senators 1as
70
David L. Boren, of Oklahoma, and Joseph R. Bidden, of Delaware.
participation; a guarantee that other nations would contribute; a timetable for the first
review of the operation and also for the option to terminate American involvement; and
a clear expression of support from the United States Congress. Friedman, supra note 161,
at Al, A16. President Clinton also suggested that the United Nations should address these
types of questions before voting on whether to commence a proposed peacekeeping
operation. Id. The United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia all support President
Clinton's approach toward approving future peacekeeping operations. Lewis, Nations
Urge Prudence, supra note 60, at A2. The President summarized his Administration's
guidelines for future American participation in United Nations missions by declaring, "If
the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know
when to say no." Id.; Clinton's Words, supra note 162, at A16; Reality Test, supra note
52, at A20.
164. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22.
165. Robert G. Torricelli, US, UN Face Opportunityfor Global Peace, CHRISTIAN
Sa. MoNrroR, Dec. 15, 1992, at 19. But see Boren, supra note 11 (Gardner proposes
that forty to fifty members contribute to a rapid deployment force of 100,000 volunteers).
166. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22.
167. Torricelli, supra note 165.
168. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22.
169. Id. at A22, A24.
170. Not The World's Cop, NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 1993, at 27 [hereinafter Cop]; Goshko
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The group was headed by R. James Woolsey, a former ambassador,
Pentagon official and director of the Central Intelligence Agency."'1 The
proposal advocates the creation of three tiers of United Nations forces,
each of which would be available following a Council resolution
authorizing the Secretary-General to act." r The three tiers are: (1) a
small, highly-trained and mobile rapid-response force; (2) a heavily-armed
larger force directly under the control of the Secretary-General and the
Council; and (3) a multinational reserve force of previously allocated
troops that would come under United173Nations command in the event of a
large conflict such as the Gulf War.
The first tier would consist of a small, standing force of elite, highlytrained soldiers from one or two nations and would have limited objectives
following deployment, such as securing airports and communication
centers. " It would serve permanently under a United Nations commander
and could only be deployed after Council authorization.1 71 Stationed at
one or two permanent bases where it would receive frequent training, 76
the standing force would also participate in exercises with national forces
committed to United Nations command, in order to ensure the complete
integration of forces during a military operation. 77
The second tier of forces would consist of highly-trained combat
troops, available to the United Nations on forty-eight to seventy-two hours
notice.
The standing brigade of the United States' Eighty-Second
Airborne Division typifies the kind of troops that could be put at the
Council's disposal.179 This rapid deployment force would require airlift
& Gellman, supra note 41, at A22, A24; see generally PARTNERS, supra note 5.
171. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22, A24; PARTNERS, supra note 5, at iiiiv. To review Mr. Woolsey's testimony, see Hearing of the Senate Select Communrtee on
Intelligence, Fed. News Service, Feb. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
FEDNEW File (nomination of R. James Woolsey to become director of Central
Intelligence).
172. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 32-33.
173. Id.; Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22, A24.
174. See PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 32; Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22;
Torricelli, supra note 165.
175. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 32.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22; Press Conference, supra note 99;
Cop, supra note 170, at 27, 28; PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33.
179. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33.
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capacity to transport the troops anywhere in the world, land-force capacity
to quickly control critical ground targets, and air and naval forces capable
of supporting the ground units, particularly against threats from tanks and
other armor.1 ° This force would likely consist of several tens of
thousands of troops from the major contributors,"' trained to operate
effectively with each other in the foreign, hostile environments they would
police. 182
The third tier would consist of large-scale forces, under a unified
United Nations command, capable of conducting a major military
operation,"' comparable to the Coalition forces employed during the Gulf
War. ' Commitments from various member nations would be required to
ensure that even if some nations withheld their forces during a crisis, the
Council would still command forces and equipment necessary to
accomplish its military objectives. 185
There are obvious advantages to designating troops in advance,
instead of organizing them ad hoc, as was done in the Gulf War."8 6 Such
designation increases the likelihood that a nation will in fact commit troops
when the Council determines that a need exists."8 7 The forces would
participate in regular training exercises utilizing common language
procedures and doctrines designed to integrate troops and assure combat
effectiveness. 8 Furthermore, previously designated forces would allow
for the planning of a stable command structure to direct the forces as soon
as they are activated. 8 9
Peacekeeping operations require different skills from those generally
possessed by soldiers in national armies. " For example, the United
180. Id.
181. Cop, supra note 170, at 27, 28; PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33; Goshko &
Gellman, supra note 41, at A22.
182. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33.
183. See Cop, supra note 170, at 27, 28; PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33; Goshko &
Gellman, supra note 41, at A22.
184. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 33.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. James E. Goodby, The New European Security Agenda, WASH. Q., Spring 1992,
at 153, 166; Lance Morrow, An Interview: The Man In The Middle, MHQ: Q.J. Mil.
Hist., Autumn 1992, at 48, 51; see generally Rod Paschall, Tactical Exercises: The
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States employs special criteria when selecting personnel for UN
peacekeeping duties. 9 ' United Nations peacekeeping forces currently
participate in planning and training at all command levels."9 The cost of
training one soldier for two weeks can easily reach $40,000. 193 Moreover,
the latest technology and equipment is essential for the demanding tasks
of peace enforcement."
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") could provide
training for some peacekeeping units.' 95 However, unlike NATO troops,
whose training has anticipated battle with Warsaw Pact forces in Europe,
United Nations troops cannot predict the particular foe or combat scenario
they might encounter. 96 Therefore, it is impossible to formulate more
than broad contingency plans, and training must anticipate operating under
a wide range of conditions against unknown adversaries. 97 Standardized
equipment and regular, rigorous training exercises are necessary,19 8 if
multinational forces are to form a coherent, effective, military force.
The effectiveness of logistical support-bases, storage depots, and
additional facilities-and troop and material transport will require special
agreements to guarantee access by United Nations forces into areas of
Impartial Buffer, MHQ: Q.J. MIL. HIST., Autumn 1992, at 52.
191. See Senate, supra note 62. Some of the relevant criteria include: a minimum six
years of military service, rank of captain or above, special security clearance of secret,
knowledge of infantry tactics and vehicles, ability to read maps and use a compass,
language ability, previous staff experience, combat experience, troop training experience,
previous United Nations experience, and excellent physical condition. Id.
192. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 35.
193. Raymond Ridgway, Reserving Decision on Cost of Keeping Peace, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Nov. 10, 1992, at All; but see Polishing Blue Helmets, supra note 46, at 40
(the Canadians, who are experienced peacekeepers, claim that only a modest amount of
special training is required to turn a good soldier into a good peacekeeper).
194. Paul Y. Hammond, It's lTime the World Had a Forcefor Peacemaking, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IHT File.
195. Goodby, supra note 190.
196. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 35. Ironically, with the demise of the Warsaw Pact,
NATO no longer has a specific adversary for strategic planning and training purposes.
197. See id. The United Nations facility in Niinisalo, Finland, established in 1969 to
prepare soldiers from Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway for peacekeeping missions,
is the most comprehensive United Nations training facility in the world. Greenberg, supra
note 22, at 64. Training lasts for approximately five weeks for officers and four weeks
for soldiers. Id. To learn their trade, soldiers practice mock scenarios that mimic those
of current United Nations operations. See id. at 64-65. English is the official language
used in United Nations peacekeeping, in order to facilitate communication. Id. at 65.
198. PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 35.
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potential conflict. I" Special agreements may also be necessary to provide
for a nation's ability to exclude troops from a military operation, even if
the forces are under UN command.2 '0 The Council must negotiate such
agreements with the world's military powers, as these nations' troops
would form the core of a United Nations military effort. °1
It is not necessary for all nations to supply troops; 202 for example,
some nations could supply the logistics of transport and support supplies,
while others could ensure that supply depots remained ready. 2 3 The
Council might also enter into agreements with regional bodies such as
NATO, to bolster the United Nations' ability to maintain the peace.' As
with any large-scale operation, flexible arrangements are necessary and a
certain amount of improvisation is inevitable.2 °5
D. Criticisms of a United Nations Army
Critics charge that a standing United Nations force would be
inconsistent with the United Nations' role in international conflict
199. Id. at 30.
200. See Prial, supra note 92 (denial of troop requests based on overriding national
defense requirements would be permitted); PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 30.
201.

PARTNERS,

supra note 5, at 31.

202. Id.
203. Id. Nations that do not contribute troops and elect to provide alternative support
such as supplying equipment or supplies may be perceived as "buying" their way out of
the conflict. During the Gulf War, for instance, some people questioned the fairness of
sending American troops to fight while other nations, such as Kuwait and Japan, provided
only financial aid.
204. See BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10,
60-65;
PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 31; see, e.g., NATO Rethinking Future Force Structure,
Agence France Presse, Dec. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File
(noting that NATO offered troops to guard UN relief convoys in the former Yugoslavia);
Nicholas Doughty, NATO Agrees To U.N. Request ForBalkan Action Plan, Reuters, Dec.
15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File (noting that the United
Nations asked NATO to plan military action in the former Yugoslavia); Nicholas Doughty,
NATO Offers To Organize Enforcement of Bosnian No-Fly Zone, Reuters, Jan. 15, 1993,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File (noting that NATO offered to organize
enforcement of no-fly zone); see generally Who Will Fightfor the World?, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 30, 1993, at 15 (suggesting that NATO is the best alternative for a global army).
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd believes the United Nations should make more
use of regional organizations such as the European Community and NATO. Lewis, Ethnic
Conflict, supra note 149, at All.
205.

PARTNERS,

supra note 5, at 31.
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resolution.' °6 Indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for United
Nations forces to remain impartial in the midst of combat.2"7 The prospect
of becoming bogged down in prolonged armed conflicts also exists." 8
Some argue that if a United Nations army engages in warfare, it will
become part of the problem instead of the solution. 2°
Critics contest the United Nations' role as armed peacekeeper because
they fear that the United Nations will no longer be considered an impartial
mediator.210 The United Nations has committed soldiers and relief
supplies to Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet the results of these operations
seem disappointing to many observers.211 Serbs view the relief workers
as agents of the Council, which imposed a trade embargo on them.212
Muslims view the operation as a hypocritical effort by the West to
alleviate its conscience while refusing them the means of self-defense.2 3
Croats regard the protection of Serbian enclaves located in Croatian
territory as an impediment to the restoration of these areas to Croatian
control. 214 When the Secretary-General visited Sarajevo, he was criticized
for urging negotiations over military intervention against the Serbs. 15 In
addition, many have criticized United Nations intervention in Somalia.
Demonstrators pelted the United Nations headquarters in Mogadishu with
grapefruits and stones when Boutros-Ghali visited.21 6 They accused the
United Nations of keeping the country divided to facilitate the installation
of a neo-colonialist regime.217 These incidents illustrate the risk the United
Nations runs in appearing to have abandoned its neutral status as a result
of active participation in disputes.21 8
206. Ruggie, supra note 148.
207. See generally Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41 (noting the Third World's

resistance to representative forces of the industrial powers enforcing the status quo).
208. Hammond, supra note 194.
209. Strobel, supra note 136.
210. Lewis, U.N. Casualty, supra note 49.

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Secretary-General,supra note 137.
216. Angry Somalis Ruin Visit by U.N. Leader, TORONTO

STAR,

Jan. 4, 1993, at A2.

217. DemonstratorsDisrupt U.N. Chiefs Visit to Mogadishu, Agence France Presse,
Jan. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.

218. These incidents may also suggest that if United Nations intervention is disfavored
by all of the belligerents, the United Nations has nevertheless succeeded in maintaining
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Opponents charge that all member nations will not be treated equally
because Council members protect their interests with their veto power.2" 9
The prospect of a standing United Nations army disturbs many Third
World nations, who perceive it as a potential tool of Western
imperialism.' 2 To alleviate these nations' concerns, a UN army would
have to be militarily effective and comprised of troops acceptable to all
nations involved." 2 These criticisms highlight the United Nations'
struggle in moving from its traditional peacekeeping role to a new role in
peace enforcement. 222
Even if Boutros-Ghali raises the necessary troops, a United Nations
force would still require additional soldiers, equipment, heavy weapons,
Moreover, existing peacekeeping operations
and air and sea support.'
already overwhelm the United Nations' fiscal and administrative
A fact-finding team that Boutros-Ghali sent to Sarajevo
capacity.'
determined that many of the newly-arrived peacekeeping units had no
experience or training in peacekeeping operations.' m Member contingents
have little experience working with each other 6 and, since no nation
wants to see its troops killed, few countries contribute soldiers to United
Nations operations.' m Significantly, few nations volunteered to identify
a neutral posture.
219. Morrison,supra note 28, at 2251. Many of the United Nations' members believe
that the Council is little more than an arm of western foreign policy because its five
permanent members are the victors of World War H. Heart of Gold, supra note 36, at
22. Moreover, there is a widespread feeling among members that the Council's present
composition does not reflect the realities of the new world order. Paul Lewis, Japan and
Germany Show No Zealfor Council Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at A16.
220. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22. See also All Things Considered
(NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 29, 1992). availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT File
(arguing that many smaller countries worry that a United Nations army would simply
enforce the status quo as defined by the big industrial powers); Mr. Human Rights, supra
note 43, at 59 ("Many countries, particularly in the Third World, are appalled by the
thought of yet more power in the hands of an American-led Security Council.").
221. See, e.g., Torricelli, supra note 165. For instance, British troops and Nepalese
Gurkhas would not find ready acceptance anywhere in Asia. Id.
222. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41, at A22.
223. International,supra note 22.
224. Ruggie, supra note 148; see discussion supra part H.D.
225. Preston, supra note 45.
226. Morrison, supra note 28, at 2254.
227. Crises, supra note 47. Governments cannot be expected to risk their soldier's
lives unless the peacekeepers are deployed in sufficient numbers, with appropriate
weapons, and provided with a clear military task within a humanitarian or political

N.Y.L. SCH, J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 14

in advance the troops and equipment they would provide the United
Nations if requested.22
Critics have also charged that proposals for a standing United Nations
army are both premature and misguided.229 They claim that the United
Nations knows nothing about conducting peacekeeping operations and
actually gets in the way of countries that do.23 Major General Lewis
MacKenzie, 1 commander of the Canadian troops that "reopened" the
Sarajevo airport, said of the situation in Bosnia, "[clountries don't give
their troops to the [United Nations] in trust to be killed trying to
implement a really lousy ceasefire agreement arranged by a bunch of
diplomats and politicians. "232 Essentially, critics contend that the United
Nations, as a result of its multinational decision making structure, fails to
make the tough, unified decisions required of a successful military
operation.2 3' Numerous questions linger concerning the composition of
troops, logistics, transport, training, command structure and the mission,
mandate, and size of the force. 234 Currently, NATO is the only large-scale
standing army organized under an integrated multinational command
structure.235
Funding and logistics for operations remain haphazard and
inadequate." 6 There is no standing stock of equipment, no capital reserve
fund, and no operational doctrine." Training is virtually nonexistent, and
the administrative apparatus is small in size and short on military
experience. 8 So at odds is the membership, that one United Nations
official dismisses the need for a modern war room at headquarters,239
framework. Rescue the Rescuer, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 18.
228. See Boutros-Ghali, Empowering, supra note 24, at 93.
229. Ruggie, supra note 148.
230. Newell, supra note 50.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
232. Newell, supra note 50.
233. Morrison, supra note 28, at 2254.
234. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41.
235. Ruggie, supra note 148; PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 34-35.
236. Ruggie, supra note 148.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Lewis, War Room, supra note 94 ("The management of peacekeeping forces
is essentially political. You're trying to prevent wars not make them.").
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while another laments the lack of military headquarters.' 0 The proposed
United Nations army would only work efficiently with the support of the
major powers."4 Even with such support, however, the UN requires a
massive increase in funds to finance present and future operations. 2 For
example, inequity in pay scales has resulted in an excess of civilian
administrators in Cambodia and a shortage in Bosnia. 4 3
Additionally, many members are suspicious of such a force because
they fear it will enable the United Nations to pry into their internal
affairs. 2 " Developing nations warn that respect for sovereignty cannot be
dismissed outright, even if done on behalf of a noble cause." Moreover,
it is unknown what the reaction will be if United Nations troops kill
As a result, critics
civilians or if the troops themselves are wounded.'
suggest that the United Nations take a conservative approach toward
maintaining a standing army until it can successfully address existing
concerns. 247
Opponents of the concept of a standing army argue that the United
Nations should encourage regional issue resolution, so that the institution
will not become overloaded. 248 Furthermore, they suggest that the United
Nations should focus on strengthening its ability to perform its present
peacekeeping duties before taking on more complex functions, such as a
standing army. 9 These critics contend that instead of deploying offensive
forces, the United Nations should create a substantial, well-equipped, and
mobile force that would be deployed only in a defensive capacity.2 5 ' Such
a force would be armed with anti-tank weapons and air defense systems
240. Newell, supra note 50.
241. International,supra note 22.
242. Lewis, Europeans Urge, supra note 145.

See also Anthony Goodman, U.N.

Forces Now Are for Peace-Keeping, Not Enforcement, Reuter Library Rep., June 20,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File (explaining that the United
Nations struggled to meet a peacekeeping bill of approximately $420 million last year and

the total for the next twelve months is likely to soar over $2.7 billion).
243. Newell, supra note 50.
244. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41.
245. Morrison, supra note 28, at 2251.
246. Strobel, supra note 136.
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to act as "shields rather than swords."O' If these forces failed to deter
aggression, concerted offensive actions, similar to those organized during
the Gulf War, would remain available. 2
E. The United States'Position Regarding a United Nations Army
The creation of a United Nations army is dependent on United States
approval and support. As the world's only remaining superpower, the
United States possesses the military capability and expertise that could help
transform a United Nations army into a potent force. As the largest
contributor to the UN budget, United States financial assistance is required
to help defray the cost of a United Nations army.- 3 The Pentagon,
however, has numerous objections to any United States participation in a
permanent United Nations force.' United States officials criticize United
Nations Charter provisions on joint military commands as being too
unwieldy and are skeptical of the military competence of UN peacekeeping
authorities. 25 They also fear that Americans would be special targets in
many Third World conflicts due to resentment toward the United States
and the fear of superpower domination. 6 Washington, in turn, presently
regards the prospect of a standing United Nations army headed by a nonAmerican officer as unacceptable. 2 7 American critics also worry that such
a force would entangle the United States in situations where it maintains
no overriding national interest. 8 Some even fear that a United Nations
army could be used against the United States or its interests.259 However,
given the United States' veto power over the use of a United Nations
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Buying Blue Helmets, supra note 63 (noting that the United States pays
twenty-five percent of the United Nations budget and would be assessed more if a limit
on contributions had not been set).

Citing changed global economic conditions and noting that the assessment system has
not been revised since 1973, President Clinton asked the United Nations General
Assembly to reduce America's share of the peacekeepingbudget to reflect the rise of other
nations that can now bear more of the financial burden. Clinton's Words, supra note 162,
at A16; Friedman, supra note 161, at Al, A16.
254. Goshko & Gellman, supra note 41.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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army, this possibility seems remote.
Despite objections, former President George Bush informed United
Nations members that the United States was ready to support a greatly
expanded role for peacekeeping operations and to adapt the United States
military to better assist in such operations. 2" He did not, however, offer
to commit any ground troops26 1 or promise to pay $733.1 million in dues
and arrears that the United States owes the United Nations. 262 The Senate
did, nevertheless, approve Defense Department expenditures of up to $300
million to support United Nations peacekeeping operations. 2 3
United States military bases, intelligence agencies, and engineering
corps are being adapted to participate in peacekeeping operations. 2"
Military academies are instituting a peacekeeping curriculum to train
combat, engineering, and logistical units in all areas of peacekeeping
activities .26' These units will work with the United Nations to maximize
the United States' lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence
capabilities in support of peacekeeping operations. 2" Joint simulations and
exercises would further strengthen the United States' ability to undertake
multinational peacekeeping operations.267
III. CONCLUSION

The new world order continues to develop at a terrifying pace.268
Since the end of the cold war, the United Nations has found itself in the
260. Friedman, supra note 143; Bush Offers Expanded U.S. PeacekeepingRole, Reuter

Library Rep., Sept. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File
[hereinafter Role]; Bush, supra note 153; Murray, supra note 153; cf. supra notes 161-63
and accompanying text (discussing the Clinton administration's vision of potential
American participation in future United Nations peacekeeping operations).
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forces for intervention in regional crises, use in United Nations peacekeeping operations,
and for disaster relief is General Colin Powell's most important recommendation to
restructure the military).
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forefront of the international arena. If armed only with the power of
gentle persuasion, the United Nations lacks the ability to assert its will
forcibly when nations ignore Council resolutions. The formation of a UN
army is necessary to provide the United Nations with credibility as a
global institution capable of enforcing its mandate.
It is time to create a United Nations army that can confront present
and future crises."' The provisions already exist in the United Nations
Charter for the formation of such an army; however, the reluctance of the
United States continues to prevent such a formation. Yet, without a
United Nations army, the United States quite possibly will be forced to act
as the world's police officer in order to resolve international conflicts, an
idea that does not appeal to most Americans.27
Furthermore, the
existence of a United Nations army would allow the United States to
maintain its international commitments at a fraction of the material,
energy, and monetary costs to do it alone.
A truly integrated fighting force capable of projecting United Nations
power worldwide cannot be created overnight.
However, NATO
represents a successful model to emulate; moreover, militarily adept
nations, such as the United States, could provide equipment, bases, and
training for United Nations forces. While financial, military, and political
problems remain to be solved if a United Nations army is to become an
effective tool for preventing and resolving international conflicts, such
concerns should not prevent the formation of such an army. Members
should focus on how a United Nations force should be structured, not on
whether it should be created.
A United Nations army will not be a panacea for the world's
problems.
Some situations may be unsuitable for United Nations
intervention; however, an army would provide the United Nations with
enhanced ability to offer solutions to international crises. By itself, the
threat of armed United Nations intervention may be sufficient to deter
aggression or spur efforts to find diplomatic solutions. The old ways of
doing business will not work in the new world order; the formation of a
United Nations army is the next logical step in the evolution of collective
security. For the United Nations to serve as an effective forum for
peaceful cooperation among nations, it must also be the world's police
officer when the situation dictates.
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